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_____________ 
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______________ 
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 2 
 
Bryan G. Baumann, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Alexander K. Cox, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Knox, McLaughlin, Gornall & Sennett, P.C. 
120 West 10th Street 
Erie, PA 16501 
 
 Counsel for Appellant/Cross-Appellee 
 
 
Thomas A. Pendleton, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Dominick A. Sisinni, Esq. 
MacDonald, Illig, Jones & Britton LLP 
100 State Street, Suite 700 
Erie, PA 16507 
 
 Counsel for Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
Plaintiff Pennsylvania International Academy, LLC (the “Academy”) brought this 
action against Defendant Fort LeBoeuf School District (the “School District”), asserting 
that 24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 13-1361(1) (the “busing statute”) required the School District to 
provide free bus transportation to its students.  The School District asserts that federal 
immigration law preempts the statute.  We agree with the District Court that the 
immigration law does not preempt the busing statute and will affirm its order granting 
summary judgment on the Academy’s claim for subrogation, but we will vacate its order 
declining to rule on the Academy’s remaining claims and remand for further proceedings. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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I 
The Academy operates a residential boarding facility for high school students (the 
“Students”) who are F-1 visa holders1 attending private school at Mercyhurst Preparatory 
School (“Mercyhurst”) in Erie, Pennsylvania.  For the six years prior to the 2016-2017 
school year, the School District provided free bus transportation to the Students to and 
from Mercyhurst.  Then, in June 2016, the School District notified the Academy that, 
because the Students were F-1 visa holders, the School District would charge the 
Students for their school transportation, at a cost of $765 per Student for the 2016-2017 
school year.  Rather than pay the approximately $87,975 the School District would have 
charged the Academy, the Academy arranged to provide transportation for the Students 
for that school year at a cost it originally estimated as $26,207. 
The Academy filed this lawsuit against the School District in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Erie County, Pennsylvania, and the School District removed the case 
to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  The 
Academy sought: (1) a mandamus in the form of a permanent injunction requiring the 
School District to provide free transportation to its students (Count One); (2) subrogation 
of the $26,207 the Academy paid during the 2016-2017 school year to transport the 
Students to Mercyhurst (Count Two); and (3) damages in the amount of $26,207 for the 
School District’s alleged deprivation of the Students’ property right to free school bus 
                                              
1 F-1 visa holders are a class of nonimmigrants who enter the United States to 
attend school and plan on leaving the country after their course of study is complete.  8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i). 
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transportation without due process (Count Three).  The parties later amended the 
damages amount to $29,774.10 in a stipulation that also converted the Academy’s 
contested motion to dismiss into cross-motions for summary judgment concerning 
whether federal immigration law preempts the busing statute.   
The District Court denied the School District’s motion but granted the Academy’s 
motion on Count Two and ordered the School District to reimburse the Academy for the 
money it paid to transport the Students.  Pa. Int’l Acad., LLC v. Fort LeBoeuf Sch. Dist., 
No. 1:16-cv-0251, 2017 WL 839492, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2017).  Regarding Counts 
One and Three, the District Court said that, because it “fully resolved the preemption 
matter in favor of the Academy, [it would] not and need not address the Academy’s” 
request for an injunction or its § 1983 claim.  Id.  The School District appeals the District 
Court’s order denying its motion for summary judgment, and the Academy cross-appeals 
the Court’s order declining to rule on Counts One and Three. 
II2 
The main question before us is whether federal immigration law preempts a statute 
that requires the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to provide busing to students who 
attend private nonprofit schools.  The statute provides, among other things, that 
                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s decision on 
summary judgment de novo.  Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 549 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 
2008).  Summary judgment is appropriate where, drawing all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the non-moving party, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).   
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[w]hen provision is made by a board of school directors for the [free] 
transportation of public school pupils to and from . . . schools [located within 
the district boundaries or outside the district boundaries at a distance not 
exceeding ten miles by the nearest public highway], . . . the board of school 
directors shall also make identical provision for the free transportation of 
pupils who regularly attend nonpublic kindergarten, elementary and high 
schools not operated for profit to and from such schools.  
 
24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 13-1361(1).  There is no dispute that the School District provides free 
bus transportation to its public school students and that Mercyhurst is a private nonprofit 
school located within ten miles of the School District.  Thus, the busing statute plainly 
requires the School District to provide free bus transportation to the Students.  The 
School District, however, contends that the statutory obligation to provide nonimmigrant 
students busing is preempted by federal law.    
The preemption doctrine stems from the Supremacy Clause, which provides that 
“the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”  U.S. Const. art. 
VI, cl. 2.  Thus, “Congress . . . has the power to preempt state law.”  In re Vehicle Carrier 
Servs. Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 71, 83 (3d Cir. 2017).  There are three categories of 
preemption: express preemption, field preemption, and conflict preemption.  Holk v. 
Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 334 (3d Cir. 2009).  Since preemption is an 
affirmative defense, we examine the specific preemption defense the School District 
asserted.  In re Vehicle, 846 F.3d at 84.  
The School District argues that the busing statute is subject to conflict preemption, 
which occurs where “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical 
impossibility,” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012) (quoting Fla. Lime & 
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Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)), or “where the challenged 
state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress’” id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).  
The School District argues that it is impossible to comply with both federal and state law 
and that compliance with the state statute poses an obstacle to achieving Congress’s 
objectives.   
In evaluating the School District’s argument, we start with the presumption against 
preemption and that “the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded 
by [a] [f]ederal [a]ct unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”  
Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 687 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Wyeth 
v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009)).  We therefore “presume claims based on laws 
[reflecting the exercise of] state police powers are not preempted.”  In re Vehicle, 846 
F.3d at 84; see also Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 115 (3d Cir. 2010). 
Providing education is traditionally a state government function.  See, e.g., 
Edinboro College Park Apartments v. Edinboro Univ. Found., 850 F.3d 567, 577 n.9 (3d 
Cir. 2017).  Because the busing statute concerns the provision of school transportation, 
and because school busing falls within the powers traditionally exercised by a state 
government, see Robert S. v. Stetson Sch., Inc., 256 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2001), we 
presume that the federal immigration statutes do not conflict with the busing statute 
“unless Congress has made such an intention ‘clear and manifest,’” see MD Mall 
Assocs., LLC v. CSX Transp. Inc., 715 F.3d 479, 489 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Bates v. 
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Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005)).3  The School District argues that 
Congress’s intent to preempt the busing statute is reflected in the federal immigration 
statutes and regulations governing the issuance of student visas, which evince Congress’s 
desire for aliens to be self-sufficient.  None of the statutes upon which the School District 
relies applies to the Students. 
F-1 visa holders are required to demonstrate that they have sufficient funds to 
cover tuition, fees, and living expenses and provide documentary evidence of financial 
support.  8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(1)(i)(B); 22 C.F.R. § 41.61(b)(1)(ii).  A public school F-1 
visa holder must go further and “demonstrate[] that the [student] has reimbursed the local 
educational agency that administers the school for the full, unsubsidized per capita cost of 
providing education at such school for the period of the [student’s] attendance.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1184(m)(1)(B)(ii).4  The School District acknowledges that the Students are not 
“expressly bound by” this provision, Appellant Br. 18, but argue that Congress still 
intended for private school students to pay for any public benefits they receive, including 
free school transportation, because it sought to ensure that all F-1 visa holders not rely on 
                                              
 
3 Although the federal government has “broad, undoubted power over the subject 
of immigration and the status of aliens,”Arizona, 567 U.S. at 394-95, the busing statute 
does not concern the regulation of immigration, even tangentially.  Accordingly, it is 
unlike the ordinances at issue in Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 724 F.3d 297, 318 (3d Cir. 
2013), upon which the School District relies.   
4 The School District also invokes a part of § 1184 that provides that F-1 visa 
holders violate their nonimmigrant status if they obtained the status to enter private 
school and then switch to public school.  8 U.S.C. § 1184(m)(2).  The School District, 
however, does not assert that the Students have switched to a taxpayer-funded public 
school.  Thus, the statute is not applicable.  
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any public support while studying in the United States, and the busing statute is an 
obstacle to accomplishing this goal.  This argument fails. 
 The plain language of the statute shows that Congress deliberately treated private 
school F-1 visa holders differently from their public school counterparts.  Moreover, the 
statute does not suggest that an F-1 visa holder attending a private school violates the 
terms of his or her visa simply by virtue of receiving specific benefits from a local public 
school district.  See 8 U.S.G. §§ 1182(a)(4)(A), 1184(m)(2). 
 While there is no doubt that Congress intended F-1 visa holders, like all 
nonimmigrant aliens, to be self-sufficient, id. § 1601(1)-(2), and an “alien who . . . is 
likely at any time to become a public charge,” id. § 1182(a)(4)(A), is inadmissible, the 
School District concedes that the Students’ receipt of free busing does not make them 
public charges and does not show that the Students lack self-sufficiency.  As a result, 
Congress’s objective in ensuring nonimmigrants are self-sufficient is not impeded by 
providing F-1 visa-holders free busing. 
For these reasons, the District Court correctly concluded that the federal 
immigration laws do not preempt the busing statute. 
III 
 We next review whether the District Court erred in granting relief on Plaintiff’s 
claim for subrogation in Count Two. 
 Under Pennsylvania law, subrogation is a means to “plac[e] the ultimate burden of 
[a] debt upon the person who should bear it,” Topelski v. Universal South Side Autos, 
Inc., 180 A.2d 414, 421 (Pa. 1962) (quoting Potoczny v. Vallejo, 85 A.2d 675, 677 (Pa. 
 9 
 
Super. Ct. 1952)), and it is “applicable whenever a debt or obligation is paid from the 
funds of one person although primarily payable from the funds of another,” Anderson v. 
Greenville Borough, 273 A.2d 512, 514 (Pa. 1971).  The remedy of equitable subrogation 
is available where a claimant demonstrates: “(1) the claimant paid the creditor to protect 
his own interests; (2) the claimant did not act as a volunteer; (3) the claimant was not 
primarily liable for the debt . . . ; (4) the entire debt has been satisfied; and (5) allowing 
subrogation will not cause injustice to the rights of others.”  Tudor Dev. Grp., Inc. v. U.S. 
Fid. & Guar. Co., 968 F.2d 357, 361 (3d Cir. 1992).     
 All elements of a claim for subrogation are satisfied here.  The statute requires the 
School District to provide free bus transportation to the Students, but it refused to do so 
for the 2016-2017 school year, requiring the Academy to pay for the transportation.  The 
Academy did not act as a volunteer and, under the busing statute, was not primarily liable 
for the costs associated with the school transportation.  In addition, the Academy paid the 
entire amount due for such transportation and allowing subrogation will not cause 
injustice to the rights of others.  Therefore, the District Court did not err in granting 
summary judgment on the Academy’s claim for subrogation. 
IV 
Finally, we turn to the District Court’s order declining to rule on Counts One or 
Three for, respectively, a permanent injunction requiring the School District to provide 
free transportation to the Students and deprivation of property without due process in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The District Court concluded that, because it “fully 
resolved the preemption matter in favor of the Academy, [it would] not and need not 
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address” either of these claims.  Pa. Int’l Acad., 2017 WL 839492, at *11.  The Academy 
argues that it is entitled to an injunction compelling the School District to provide free 
bus transportation, that the failure to provide busing deprived the Students of a property 
right without due process, that they are entitled to relief under § 1983, and that the 
stipulation concerning damages does not bar the § 1983 claim it advances on their behalf.  
Because we have no ruling on these claims to review, we will vacate the District Court’s 
order concerning Counts One and Three and remand for further proceedings on the 
Academy’s request for an injunction and its § 1983 claim.   
V 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment on Count Two, vacate its order declining to rule on Counts One and 
Three, and remand for further proceedings.  
